The intellectual network has been in disarray for much of the past decade, which reflects the current state of the broader liberal and progressive Islamist movement in Indonesia. The old guard, represented by institutions within Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, faces elite co-optation as they seek access to state resources while also grappling with ideological challenges from younger members allied with progressive, leftist and environmentalist Islamist groups such as Islam Bergerac and the Green Muhammadiyah Cadres (Kader Hijaw Muhammadiyah).
This ideological division made it difficult for former figures in the group – and the progressive Islamic movement in Indonesia in general – not only to advance the interests of the ummah (the Muslim community), but also to effectively turn the tide of affairs against the conservative Islamic movement.
Researchers have attributed the group’s decline to its “boundary-testing strategies,” its elitism, and the broader “conservative shift” in Indonesia. Ideologically, although all of the group’s thinkers claim to support civil liberties in religious matters, they have little in common. Some of them are staunch defenders of freedom and free markets; Others lean toward democratic socialism and can be described as “liberal left.”
Although the group no longer presents a coherent “liberal” identity, its individual members continue to shape Islamic discourse through their own activism and programs. Some former JIL figures host the liberal YouTube channel Cokro TV. Others take on leadership or membership roles in organizations such as NU or the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). But their emergence has done little to revive institutional cohesion. These ideological differences accelerated the group’s slide into irrelevance within the liberal movement in Indonesia.
